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Recently, verbal credibility assessment has been extended to the detection of deceptive inten-
tions, the use of a model statement, and predictive modeling. The current investigation com-
bines these 3 elements to detect deceptive intentions on a large scale. Participants read a
model statement and wrote a truthful or deceptive statement about their planned weekend
activities (Experiment 1). With the use of linguistic features for machine learning, more than
80% of the participants were classified correctly. Exploratory analyses suggested that liars
included more person and location references than truth‐tellers. Experiment 2 examined
whether these findings replicated on independent‐sample data. The classification accuracies
remained well above chance level but dropped to 63%. Experiment 2 corroborated the finding
that liars' statements are richer in location and person references than truth‐tellers' statements.
Together, these findings suggest that liars may over‐prepare their statements. Predictive
modeling shows promise as an automated veracity assessment approach but needs validation
on independent data.
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On March 22, 2016, two suicide bombers detonated nail bombs at
Brussels Airport in Zaventem, killing and seriously injuring many inno-
cent civilians. In the aftermath of the terror attack, officials expressed
concerns about the level of security, pointing to systematic security
flaws and insufficient staff training at Brussels Airport (Bilefsky, 2016).
This incident suggests that an additional screening of passengers before
they arrive at the airport could be vital for the detection of aviation secu-
rity threats. Although many existing methods aim at safeguarding avia-
tion security, concerns have been voiced about the validity of these
methods (Meijer, Verschuere, & Merckelbach, 2017; Ormerod & Dando,
2015). More research regarding the screening of airport passengers is
needed to improve aviation safety. One possible line of inquiry is to
explore whether one can differentiate between true and false intentions
(Jupe, Leal, Vrij, & Nahari, 2017; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
y Published by John Wiley & Sons1.1 | Verbal deception detection
Among the more promising approaches to detect deception is examining
the verbal content to discern truthful from deceptive statements (Bond &
DePaulo, 2006; Oberlader et al., 2016). Verbal deception detection is
rooted in the assumption that the verbal account of an event is informa-
tive about the veracity of that account. For example, genuine experiences
are often reported differently than fabricated experiences, one of the
core assumptions of reality monitoring (RM, Johnson & Raye, 1981).
RM states that the differences are attributable to the process by which
the memory of an event is constructed: Memories of truthfully experi-
enced events have been obtained through perceptual processes, whereas
fabricated memories were built through cognitive operations. Deception
researchers adopted this idea and found promising results for verbal
deception detection (Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998). Meta‐analytical
findings support the notion that visual, auditory, and temporal details- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
Ltd.
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/acp 1
2 KLEINBERG ET AL.are useful in distinguishing truthful from deceptive accounts (Masip,
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). Accuracy rates of classifying liars from
truth‐tellers based on these variables are above chance level and range
from 63% to 82% (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; and
see also Levine, Blair, & Carpenter, 2017; Vrij, Blank, & Fisher, 2018;).1.2 | Detecting deceptive intentions
For many years, deception research focused on people lying about
their past actions (e.g., what someone was doing during the time of a
crime). Since recently, attention is also paid to the detection of decep-
tive intentions (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Liu‐Jönsson, 2013; Sooniste,
Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, & Granhag,
2013). There are indications that the principles that apply to the detec-
tion of deception on past events also apply to deceptive intentions
(Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). When truth‐tellers report a past event,
they can rely on their memory, whereas liars cannot if they discuss an
event they have never experienced. A similar logic may apply to lying
about intentions. Plans for future actions that are not accompanied
by an intention to execute result in a less detailed mental image of
the event than plans that are accompanied by the enactment inten-
tions (Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Szpunar, 2010). It is important to note,
however, that past events are imagined in more detail than future
events (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Gamboz et al., 2010).
Cues for deception concerning intentions might, therefore, be less
clear compared with those for past events.
To date, research into the verbal approach to the detection of
deceptive intentions has examined different verbal cues with some-
times contradicting findings. In one study, passengers at international
airports were instructed to lie or tell the truth about their forthcom-
ing trip (Vrij et al., 2011). Those who lied about their journey
provided statements that were less plausible and included more con-
tradictions than truthful statements but did not differ in the amount
of detail. Building on the notion that the expectedness of the ques-
tions asked might moderate the effectiveness of the verbal deception
detection approach (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), another series of experi-
ments asked participants expected and unexpected questions about
a fabricated or truthful future event (Fenn, McGuire, Langben, &
Blandón‐Gitlin, 2015; Warmelink et al., 2013; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann,
Jundi, & Granhag, 2012). Although differences in the amount of detail
emerged in some studies when unanticipated questions were asked
(Sooniste et al., 2013; Warmelink et al., 2013), these effects were
absent in other studies (Fenn et al., 2015; Kleinberg, Nahari, Arntz,
& Verschuere, 2017). In yet another study, it was found that markers
of good planning behavior (e.g., effective time allocation and how an
action will be carried out) were more prevalent in truthful than in
deceptive statements (Mac Giolla et al., 2013). Conversely, deceptive
statements contained more justifications for the actions (i.e., why an
action will be carried out). Furthermore, a recent study reported that
deceptive intentions contained fewer verifiable details than truthful
ones (Jupe et al., 2017). Taken together, the literature on the detec-
tion of deceptive intentions suggests that the verbal approach could
be promising and that the richness of detail might be a useful cue
to deception.1.3 | The model statement technique
A model statement is a detailed example of a verbal statement given by
someone on a topic unrelated to the current research context, and pro-
viding such a statement may help to increase verbal differences between
truth‐tellers and liars. By reading a detailed example before providing
their account, interviewees are thought to learn the level of detail that
is expected from their statement, which in turn makes them inclined to
provide more detail. Providing more detailed information should be eas-
ier for truth‐tellers than for liars: The former could easily retrieve details
from their memory of a specific event, whereas liars struggle to include
sufficient detail to match the expectations raised by the model state-
ment (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). Besides,
liars will likely not provide more detailed information after reading a
model statement because the provision of extra information could lead
to cues that give away their lie (e.g., incriminating information, Nahari,
Vrij, & Fisher, 2014) or expose the lack of contextual information in their
account (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017).
There are mixed findings as to the usefulness of the model
statement method so far. On the one hand, the provision of a model
statement led to lengthier statements and better truth–lie discrimina-
tion (i.e., truthful statements were more plausible; see Leal, Vrij,
Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Another study found that the
discrimination between truthful and deceptive insurance claims based
on the number of verifiable details improved with a model statement
(Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Lafferty, & Nahari, 2017). Moreover, a model state-
ment benefited detection accuracy when details inferred from behavior
scripts (e.g., “we went to the restaurant and ordered food and some-
thing to drink”) and complications were counted (Vrij, Leal, et al.,
2017). These studies suggest that the model statement aids deception
detection when the quality of information (e.g., plausibility, verifiability,
and number of complications) is measured. On the other hand, several
other studies have not found support for the beneficial role of a model
statement when the quantity of details is examined. In Bogaard, Meijer,
and Vrij (2014), a model statement led to lengthier statements but did
not benefit the discrimination between truth‐tellers and liars with com-
monly used verbal content analysis tools measuring quantity of detail (e.
g., RM). Likewise, there was no evidence to the beneficial effects of the
provision of a model statement for the amount of “total details” (Ewens
et al., 2016) nor for the statement quantity in children and adolescents
(Brackmann, Otgaar, Roos af Hjelmsäter, & Sauerland, 2017). In sum,
there are indications that a model statement may improve verbal
deception detection when examining verbal aspects other than the
quantity of details. Importantly, although some studies failed to find
an effect of the model statement, no study indicated that a model state-
ment impeded deception detection, and regarding quantity of details,
several studies showed that it increased the information provided (e.
g., Bogaard et al., 2014; Leal et al., 2015). The current study tests
whether the model statement technique can facilitate the detection
of truthful and deceptive intentions.1.4 | Large‐scale deception detection
In a setting such as prospective airport passenger screening, large‐scale
deception detection may be only applicable when data can be
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in press). A key challenge for verbal deception detection is then the
transition from manual, human coding of verbal content towards
computer‐automated approaches. Although these two methodological
lines have the same goal of identifying deceptive and truthful content,
they both have different advantages and shortcomings (e.g., Hauch,
Blandón‐Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2015). First, the manual annotation
of a text is limited in its large‐scale potential because it relies on
instructed human coders. The efforts and time involved in the human
coding approach make it virtually unfit for the assessment of vast
numbers of statements in near real time (e.g., in airport settings).
Computer‐automated approaches are less affected by this require-
ment and can be scaled up and allow for text analysis in real time
(for a review, see Fitzpatrick, Bachenko, & Fornaciari, 2015). Second,
inherent to the involvement of human assessors in manual coding is
the lack of perfect reliability of the judgments made. Contrary to
computer‐automated approaches, the agreement between multiple
humans is never entirely perfect and therefore might pose a
threat to the validity. Because we are particularly interested in
potential large‐scale applications, we resort to computer‐automated
methods as a primary analytical tool in the current study. Several
methods have been proposed to integrate verbal deception theory
and computer‐automated analysis.1.4.1 | Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software (Pennebaker,
Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015) examines the proportion of words
belonging to one of 92 categories. The attractiveness of the LIWC is
that the categories are thought to represent psycholinguistic processes
such as the emotional tone of a text (e.g., “lucky” and “melancholic”) or
the number of cognitive processes in a text (e.g., “know” and “ought”).
Each word category is composed of a comprehensive dictionary, and
the analytical task consists of counting the number of words per cate-
gory. Several studies have successfully used the LIWC to discriminate
lies from truths (Bond & Lee, 2005; Kleinberg, Mozes, Arntz, &
Verschuere, 2017; Mihalcea & Strapparava, 2009; Ott, Choi, Cardie,
& Hancock, 2011; Pérez‐Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014).1.4.2 | Named entity recognition
Recently, it has been proposed to use named entities in verbal decep-
tion detection (Kleinberg, Mozes, et al., 2017; Kleinberg, Nahari, &
Verschuere, 2016). Named entity recognition (NER) is an information
extraction method that identifies and classifies information from natu-
ral language into predefined categories (e.g., persons, dates, and times).
Truthful statements are expected to contain more named entities than
deceptive statements because truthful accounts (a) are typically richer
in detail (Johnson et al., 1998; Masip et al., 2005), (b) contain more
verifiable details (Nahari et al., 2014), and (c) are often more contextu-
ally embedded (Köhnken, 2004). The named entity‐based approach
has been shown to be useful for the identification of deceptive and
truthful hotel reviews (Kleinberg, Mozes, et al., 2017). These findings
suggest that named entities might be a means to measure the liars'
strategy of withholding potentially incriminating information (e.g.,persons that could be consulted to verify an alibi), resulting in liars'
mentioning fewer named entities.1.5 | The current study
We investigated whether it is possible to detect truthful and decep-
tive statements about planned activities in a computer‐automated
verbal deception detection workflow (i.e., automated data collection
and automated text analysis). Because the majority of verbal decep-
tion research has been conducted regarding past activities, we also
included a comparison condition of participants who provided a
truthful or deceptive statement about their recent activities (Experi-
ment 1). To enhance verbal differences, we provided all participants
with a model statement in Experiment 1 and experimentally investi-
gated the provision of the model statement in Experiment 2.
In the first experiment, there were four conditions. In the two
truthful conditions, participants were instructed to tell the truth about
their (a) forthcoming or (b) past weekend. In the two deceptive condi-
tions, participants were instructed to lie about an activity assigned to
them (c) for the forthcoming or (d) about the past weekend. The main
focus of this study was the automated detection of deception. All
statements were therefore coded automatically using the LIWC and
named entity approaches. Because human coding is the standard in
the majority of psycholegal deception studies, we added manual anno-
tations on a subset (40%) of the statements of Experiment 1.
We expected several main effects of veracity. On the basis of the
theory of RM and the idea that richer mental images accompany gen-
uinely planned activities, it was expected that truthful statements
would be lengthier (dependent variable [DV]: no. of words), be richer
in detail (DV: richness of detail measured via LIWC and human coding),
contain more specific information (DV: named entities), and be more
plausible (DV: human‐coded plausibility) than deceptive statements.
We also expected that truthful statements would contain more refer-
ences to how (DV: human‐coded how‐utterances) an activity was exe-
cuted and fewer justifications of the actions (i.e., why they executed an
activity, DV: human‐coded why‐utterances) than deceptive statements
(Mac Giolla et al., 2013). Last, we expected that the difference
between truthful and deceptive statements would be more pro-
nounced for statements about the past than for statements about
the future (interaction hypothesis). In the exploratory analysis, we
looked at machine learning classification of truthful and deceptive
statements and examined individual linguistic predictors.1.6 | Data availability statement
The confirmatory analyses for the two experiments were pre-
registered before data collection. The preregistrations, data, and
supporting information are available at https://osf.io/wqc4p/. The
source code to the experimental tasks is available at https://github.
com/ben‐aaron188/verbal_deception_past_future.2 | EXPERIMENT 1
The local institutional review board approved both experiments
(#2016‐CP‐7306).
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2.1.1 | Participants
Data were collected through the online crowdsourcing website Prolific
Academic (https://www.prolific.ac/) where we opened spots for 327
participants. Participation was open to all participants who were native
English speakers and had not partaken in previous pilot studies. To
ensure that participants had concrete weekend plans, we collected
data just before a weekend (Thursday and Friday). All participants were
reimbursed with GBP1.50 for this study. Due to simultaneous starting
times, we collected data from 347 participants on which we applied
four preregistered exclusion criteria: double IP addresses (n = 23),
noncomplete data (n = 4), not following the instructions (n = 0), and
failing the manipulation check (i.e., not recalling the instructions after
writing the statement, n = 28; all participants were asked “How were
you instructed to write your statement?” on a scale from 0 = answer
truthfully to 100 = answer deceptively; we excluded those who indi-
cated a score higher than 10 in the truthful condition, or a score lower
than 90 in the deceptive condition).
The final sample of 292 participants was randomly allocated to
one of the four experimental conditions: truthful statement about
the past weekend (n = 73, 58.90% female, Mage = 33.92 years,
SDage = 11.43), deceptive statement about the past weekend (n = 60,
48.33% female,Mage = 35.55, SDage = 11.54), truthful statement about
the forthcoming weekend (n = 80, 60.00% female, Mage = 33.41,
SDage = 11.67), and deceptive statement about the forthcoming week-
end (n = 79, 53.16% female,Mage = 33.71, SDage = 10.05). There was no
difference between the conditions in gender, X2(3) = 2.42, p = .490,
Cramer's V = 0.05, or age, F(1, 290) = 0.04, p = .837, f = 0.01.
2.1.2 | The model statement
We adhered to the suggested guidelines for formulating a model
statement (Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats,
2016), with one exception. Given the online context of the current
investigation, we did not provide an audiotaped version but rather
presented the statement as text (as did Harvey et al., 2017). We
followed the remaining suggestions and created a statement that (a)
is unrelated to the research scenario (here: weekend plans), (b)
describes an authentic experience, and (c) is not created on the spot
during the interview.
The actual model statement was created by interviewing a friend
of one of the authors via telephone about her first day at university.
The interview was transcribed and translated into English from Dutch,
resulting in a length of 527 words (Supporting Information S1). To
ensure that the participants read the statement, they could only pro-
ceed to the next page after 1 min and were informed that they would
be asked four multiple‐choice questions about the model statement
(Supporting Information S2). If a participant failed to answer a question
correctly, she or he was redirected to the model statement followed by
four new multiple‐choice questions.
2.1.3 | Experimental manipulation
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions of
veracity (truthful vs. deceptive). Thus, participants gave either a decep-
tive or truthful statement on their planned or past activities. Liars wereassigned an activity that they had to pretend to intend for the coming
weekend (or have done on the past weekend). We allotted an activity
to liars to avoid that they used one of their previously experienced
weekend activities. To keep the selection of activities standardized,
all participants had to choose from a drop‐down menu of 31 activities
(e.g., attending a wedding; Supporting Information S3).
Past weekend plans
In the past weekend conditions, participants were asked to select at
least one activity that they had carried out last weekend and at least
three activities that they had not carried out last weekend. For those
activities that they indicated to have carried out last weekend, they
were asked to report how often they had done them before (on a
slider from never to very often). Subsequently, they were asked the
same question for the activities that they said they had not carried
out last weekend. In the truthful condition, participants were
instructed to provide a convincing account about one activity that
was randomly chosen from their selected truthful activities. In the
deceptive condition, participants were assigned one activity that they,
in the previous step, indicated to not have carried out before. For
instance, if a participant in the deceptive condition had indicated to
have “visited the zoo” but did not “go to a birthday party,” the partic-
ipant could be assigned to declare to have attended a birthday party.
To provide a little more context, we added one extra detail to the
selected activity in the deceptive condition. For example, if the deter-
mined activity was “throwing a party”, the assigned activity was
“throwing a party with your friends at your favorite pub” (Supporting
Information S4).
Future weekend plans
In the future weekend conditions, participants were asked to select at
least one activity that they were planning to do on the upcoming
weekend and at least three activities that they were not planning to
do. For the planned activities, they were asked to indicate how often
they had done them before, how certain they were about carrying
out that activity, and how well they had planned that activity. For
the activities that they indicated not to carry out, participants were
asked how often they had carried them out before and how certain
they were of not carrying them out. Equivalent to the truthful past
weekend condition, those in the truthful forthcoming weekend condi-
tion were told one activity that they intended to do next weekend. In
the deceptive forthcoming weekend condition, they were assigned the
activity that had the lowest score on how often they had done it
before and the highest score on how certain they were not to carry
out that activity. Equivalent to the past weekend plans, we find a little
more detail in the deceptive next weekend condition (e.g., “Going to a
festival in a big city with a friend”).2.1.4 | Procedure
Participants accessed the experimental task—advertised as “Lie detec-
tion study about your weekend plans”—via their Prolific account. The
minimal requirement for doing this task was a Web browser. Upon
starting the task, participants were informed about the study and gave
their consent for participating. Next, they read general instructions
1Plausibility: “Could this incident have happened as described? Could this be an
honest description of someone's weekend activities?” (Leal et al., 2015).
Richness of detail: “The inclusion of specific descriptions of place, time,
persons, objects and events in the statement” (Vrij, 2015). The occurrence of
how‐utterances: “Concrete descriptions of activities. This can include, but is
not limited to, sentences that included phrases such as ‘we planned to…’, ‘we
were going to…’, ‘we intended to…’” (Mac Giolla et al., 2013). Why‐utterances:
“There are two types of answers to ‘why’. First, wider motivations/reasons
why someone planned an activity. Second, motivations/reasons for doing some-
thing in a certain way” (Mac Giolla et al., 2013).
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tell the truth about their last (or upcoming) weekend, and some are
instructed to lie. On the next page, they gave information about their
activities during last weekend or for the forthcoming weekend (see
Section 2.1.3). Participants were then randomly allocated to an experi-
mental condition and read instructions according to their veracity and
time condition. In particular, participants were told that they were about
to write a statement about one specific activity, which was indicated in
bold letters alongside these instructions. Participants were then directed
to the model statement. Once they proceeded through the model state-
ment and the subsequent multiple‐choice test, participants received
their statement instructions emphasizing that they should make their
story “as detailed, plausible and convincing as possible.” In both veracity
conditions, participants were reminded to write only about the given
activity and that they could take the time to prepare their statement.
Moreover, they were told that each account would be read by deception
experts who would determine whether or not they believed the story. If
they were believed, they would be rewarded with an additional
GBP0.50. We paid the bonus to the participants with 20% highest over-
all proportion of named entities in their statement.
On the next screen, participants had to write their statement in a
text box. They could only proceed to the next screen if their state-
ment was at least 80 words long and if their statement was proper
English. If these criteria were not met, they were reminded about
the length and language of the required input via a pop‐up. We also
disabled the copy‐and‐pasting functionality to prevent participants
from reusing text.
After completing the statement, participants were asked three
questions to be answered with a slider from 0 to 100.
1. “How were you instructed to write your statement?” (truthful–
deceptive)
2. “How much of your statement is based on truthful elements?”
(nothing–all of it)
3. “How motivated were you to write a convincing statement?” (not
at all–absolutely)
Before exiting the experiment, all participants provided demo-
graphic information.
2.1.5 | Computer‐automated analysis
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
We used the LIWC to extract the proportions of words in each
statement that belonged to those psycholinguistic LIWC categories
that best represent the RM richness of detail. Specifically, we
modeled the richness of detail as the sum of the LIWC categories
percept (perceptual processes; including the subcategories see, hear,
and feel; e.g., saw, touch, and heard), space (spatial references; e.g.,
down and in), and time (temporal references; e.g., until and end; Bond
& Lee, 2005).
Named entity recognition
In contrast to lexicon approaches (e.g., LIWC), NER is rather flexible
towards unseen words because it bases the information classificationon probabilistic estimates derived from a supervised machine‐learning
task (Nothman, Ringland, Radford, Murphy, & Curran, 2013). For
example, it determines that “Harry Potter” is a person reference
because it is more likely to be a person than, say, a date, location, or
organization—without looking “Harry Potter” up in a database. By not
relying on a lexicon, the NER approach can classify entities without
having learned that information before. Here, we use the natural lan-
guage processing library spaCy in the Python programming language
(Version 1.3.0; Honnibal, 2016). We extract named entities of all the
categories identified by spaCy: persons (e.g., “Chris”), nationalities or
religious groups (e.g., “Chinese”), facilities (e.g., “Alum Chine”), organi-
zations (e.g., “IKEA”), geopolitical entities (e.g., “South Korea”),
locations (e.g., “Henver Road”), products (e.g., “VW”), events (e.g.,
“Birthday Party”), works of art (e.g., “Game of Thrones”), languages
(e.g., “English”), dates (e.g., “2 nights”), times (e.g., “8 am tomorrow”),
percentages (e.g., “50%”), money (e.g., “an additional $1.00”), quantities
(e.g., “about 40 miles”), ordinals (e.g., “one”), and cardinals (e.g., “2nd”).
Our outcome variable is the proportion of the occurrence of unique
occurrences of named entities (i.e., each entity is counted only once)
relative to the word count in each statement (Kleinberg, Mozes,
et al., 2017).2.1.6 | Manual coding of statements
A random subset of 147 statements (73 on past weekend plans and 74
on future weekend plans) was rated manually by two coders who were
blind to the experimental condition and hypotheses. The coders were
instructed to rate each statement as a whole on its plausibility, its rich-
ness of detail, the occurrence of how‐utterances and why‐utterances.1
Each variable was scored on a Likert scale from 1 (very low/few) to 7
(very high/many). Although recent findings suggest that counting
details is more reliable than scale judgments (Nahari, 2016), we
decided to follow the procedure of previous intentions studies
(Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2015).
Both coders received a training session in which statements were
rated and discussed with an instructor. Further, 40% of the statements
(n = 58) were rated by both coders, and the remaining 60% (n = 88)
were randomly split between the two coders. The intraclass correla-
tion coefficients were .11 for plausibility (ns), .90 for richness of
detail (p < .001), .60 for how‐utterances (p < .001), and .67 for
why‐utterances (p < .001). Because of the very low reliability of plau-
sibility, we decided not to analyze plausibility judgments.
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3.1 | Analytical plan
We conducted separate 2 (veracity: truthful vs. deceptive) by 2 (time:
past vs. future) between‐subjects ANOVAs with preregistered
Bonferroni significance level correction on each of the DVs. For seven
key DVs in the main, preregistered, analysis, we adhered to an alpha
significance level of .05/7 = .007. The effect size Cohen's f indicates
the magnitude of effects, with f = 0.10, f = 0.25, and f = 0.40 for small,
moderate, and large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988).
To compare the diagnostic efficiency of the DVs, we conducted
receiver operating characteristics analyses. We compare the areas
under the curve (AUCs) using Venkatraman's (2000) AUC comparison
test. In the exploratory analyses, we used a supervised machine learn-
ing classification task to predict the veracity of statements. All statisti-
cal analyses were conducted with R (R Core Team, 2016). For AUC
analysis, we used the pROC R package (Robin et al., 2011). The
machine learning analyses were conducted with the caret package
(Kuhn, 2017).3.2 | Confirmatory analysis
Table 1 summarizes the results for the confirmatory analyses,
expecting main effects of veracity. There was no significant interaction
effect between veracity and time for any of the DVs. For the number
of words and how‐utterances, a significant main effect of time
revealed that the statements were lengthier and contained more
how‐utterances when they were about past weekend activities than
when they were about forthcoming weekend plans. Only for one of
the four human‐coded DVs was the hypothesis supported: truth‐
tellers included more how‐utterances in their statement than liars.3.3 | Exploratory analyses
3.3.1 | Machine learning classification: Experiment 1
To predict the veracity of a statement, we used supervised machine
learning classification, which, contrary to classical statistical testing,
learns from the data to predict an outcome (for an overview, seeTABLE 1 Summary table with confirmatory analyses for Experiment 1 (M,
Dependent variable
Past Future
Truthful Deceptive Truthful Deceptiv
Number of words 261.68 (141.65) 284.12 (172.92) 233.72 (139.92) 210.38 (1
Richness of detail
(LIWC)
19.26 (4.39) 19.20 (2.88) 17.83 (4.49) 18.04 (4
% of named entities 3.35 (2.18) 4.16 (1.60) 3.90 (1.89) 3.85 (2
Richness of detail
(human coded)
4.22 (1.64) 4.97 (1.24) 4.43 (1.34) 4.14 (1
How‐utterances
(human coded)
5.16 (1.24) 4.63 (0.80) 4.60 (1.04) 4.00 (1
Why‐utterances
(human coded)
3.23 (1.26) 3.20 (1.40) 3.24 (1.06) 3.25 (1
*p < .007.Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). More specifically, in a supervised machine
learning task, a classifier algorithm is trained on a subset of the data
to predict an outcome class (here: truthful vs. deceptive). To build a
classifier algorithm, one selects features (i.e., predictor variables) based
on which the relationship to the outcome class is learned. To avoid
overfitting, we split the data into a training set (80% of the data) and
a holdout test set (20%). During the training phase, we applied a five-
fold cross‐validation with 10 repetitions (e.g., Ott et al., 2011). The
cross‐validation procedure ensures that each observation in the train-
ing data has been used for building and validating the final predictive
model. Once the final model was determined, we assessed the perfor-
mance on the holdout test set, which was not used in the training
phase. This procedure is used as a safeguard to ensure the validity of
the final model.
We used the commonly applied linear support vector machine
(SVM) as a classifier (Mihalcea & Strapparava, 2009; Ott et al., 2011).
Linear SVMs create an n‐dimensional space, where n equals the num-
ber of features and calculates a linear kernel function that splits the
data into two classes (here: truthful and deceptive). The aim is to
derive a hyperplane that splits the data in a way that the distance
between the hyperplane and the two classes in the n‐dimensional
space is maximized (Murphy, 2012).
As feature sets, we used (a) all LIWC variables (92 features) and (b)
a subset intended to model psychological processes (40 features, e.g.,
cognitive processes, negative thinking, perceptual processes, see
Supporting Information S6). Table 2 shows the performance metrics
for both past and forthcoming weekend plans.
The findings suggest the predictive models built on all LIWC
variables and the “psychological processes” subset outperform
chance classification for prospective weekend plans but not for past
weekend plans.
3.3.2 | Other LIWC variables and individual named entities
We explored whether truth–lie differences emerged on individual
LIWC or named entity categories. This also enabled us to understand
the verbal differences within the composite score of “richness of
detail.” Table 3 displays the means and effect size of the veracity
main effect for the three LIWC subcategories that formed the LIWC
richness of detail (i.e., percept, space, and time) and other individualSD, Cohen's d)
Main effect
veracity
Main effect
time
Veracity *
Time
Interaction Hyp.
Expected
truth–lie
difference
supported?e
14.88) 0.00 (p = .978) 0.18* (p = .003) 0.08 (p = .172) T > D No
.39) 0.01 (p = .880) 0.16 (p = .009) 0.02 (p = .777) T > D No
.06) 0.10 (p = .101) 0.03 (p = .605) 0.11 (p = .065) T > D No
.45) 0.08 (p = .336) 0.11 (p = .193) 0.18 (p = .031) T > D No
.13) 0.26* (p = .002) 0.28* (p = .001) 0.02 (p = .847) T > D Yes
.44) 0.00 (p = .974) 0.01 (p = .907) 0.01 (p = .920) D > T No
TABLE 2 Accuracies of the supervised machine learning task (linear support vector machine) for two different LIWC feature sets
Feature set Data Accuracy [95% CI] Sens. Spec. AUC (95% CI)
Complete LIWC Past weekend plans 69.23 [48.21, 85.67] 71.43 66.67 0.70 [0.48, 0.91]
Forthcoming weekend plans 80.65 [62.53, 92.55]a 62.50 100.00 0.75 [0.56, 0.94]
Psychological processes Past weekend plans 61.54 [40.57, 79.99] 78.87 41.67 0.77 [0.58, 0.96]
Forthcoming weekend plans 74.19 [55.39, 88.14]a 62.50 86.67 0.78 [0.62, 0.94]
Note. LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; Sens. = sensitivity; Spec. = specificity.
aSignificantly better than the chance level.
TABLE 3 Means (SDs, Cohen's d) for the dependent variables used in the exploratory analyses per time and veracity
Dependent variable
Main
effect
veracity
Past weekend plans Future weekend plans
Truthful Deceptive Main effect veracity Truthful Deceptive Main effect veracity
Richness in detail: percept −0.12* 1.93 (1.37) 2.10 (1.26) −0.06 1.52 (1.53) 1.99 (1.30) −0.17*
Richness in detail: time 0.23* 8.96 (3.05) 8.09 (2.01) 0.12 8.75 (3.41) 7.16 (2.36) 0.27*
Richness in detail: space −0.17* 8.38 (2.67) 9.02 (2.56) −0.17 7.56 (2.96) 8.90 (3.43) −0.21*
Function words (function) −0.16* 53.49 (4.08) 55.35 (3.12) −0.25* 55.89 (3.99) 56.46 (3.90) −0.07
Personal pronouns (ppron) −0.09 9.67 (2.70) 10.79 (2.30) −0.22* 10.69 (2.56) 10.53 (2.53) 0.03
First person singular (i) 0.24** 6.53 (2.70) 5.15 (2.69) 0.26* 6.80 (3.54) 5.40 (2.55) 0.23*
Numbers (number) 0.12* 1.86 (1.42) 1.57 (1.03) 0.12 1.70 (1.47) 1.41 (1.04) 0.11
Persons −0.32* 0.29 (0.49) 0.76 (0.70) −0.39* 0.34 (0.63) 0.73 (0.77) −0.27*
Geopolitical entities −0.25* 0.17 (0.45) 0.48 (0.59) −0.30* 0.27 (0.51) 0.51 (0.66) −0.21*
Dates 0.13* 1.11 (0.77) 1.06 (0.62) 0.03 1.56 (0.98) 1.17 (0.89) 0.21*
Time 0.12* 0.54 (0.68) 0.56 (0.52) −0.02 0.53 (0.59) 0.29 (0.42) 0.24*
Ordinal 0.17** 0.24 (0.39) 0.09 (0.20) 0.25* 0.13 (0.28) 0.09 (0.22) 0.08
Note. Negative effect sizes imply higher values in deceptive than in truthful statements.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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dictors in another study with the same approach (Kleinberg, Mozes,
et al., 2017). The findings suggest that although the categories per-
cept (f = −0.12), space (f = −0.17), and time (f = 0.23) were significant
in differentiating deceptive from truthful statements, they did exhibit
their effect in different directions. Only the temporal information cat-
egory (“time”) was, as could be expected from RM, higher for truthful
than for deceptive statements. The spatial information (“space”) and
perceptual processes (“percept”) were higher in deceptive than in
truthful texts. These discrepant findings might explain why the com-
posite index of the LIWC richness of detail did not indicate a signifi-
cant difference.
Table 3 further shows that persons (f = −0.32) and geopolitical
entities (f = −0.25) were the best discriminators but were both more
frequent in deceptive statements than in truthful statements. Further,
the occurrence of date (f = 0.13) and time (f = 0.12) references as well
as of ordinals (f = 0.17) was significantly higher in deceptive than in
truthful statements. Because there were no hypotheses about these
specific findings, a replication experiment is needed to identify the
robustness of these (unexpected) findings.3.4 | Discussion: Experiment 1
The confirmatory analysis of the first experiment showed that decep-
tive statements did not differ from truthful statements in length, the
richness of detail, named entities, and why‐utterances. We foundsupport only for the hypothesis that truthful statements would contain
more how‐utterances than deceptive ones. The exploratory predictive
analysis yielded promising results for machine learning classification
tasks. Deceptive and truthful plans for the forthcoming weekend were
identified with an accuracy above chance (80.64% and 74.19% for all
LIWC variables and psychological processes, respectively). Exploratory
analysis also suggested that liars included more references to persons
and places than truth‐tellers. However, this result may be due to a con-
found: Liars received slightly more specific instructions for their activi-
ties (e.g., “Going on a holiday to Spain with a friend”) than truth‐tellers
(e.g., “Going on a holiday”). As such, the inclusion of person and place
references may have been a function of the instructions rather than
the veracity. To further investigate these seemingly contradictory find-
ings and to assess the replicability of the predictive modeling results,
we ran a second experiment with preregistered hypotheses. The second
experiment also allowed us to isolate the effect of the model statement
technique. Because we were mainly interested in the emerging area of
detecting deceptive intentions, in the second experiment, we collected
data on future weekend plans only and manipulated the veracity of
the statements as well as the provision of a model statement. We fur-
ther adjusted the instructions so that both liars and truth‐tellers were
given identical instructions when writing their statement.
Moreover, recently, there has been a criticism that a cross‐
validation procedure of prediction models of any kind is lacking in
the psycholegal verbal deception research literature and has likely
resulted in overestimates of the reported accuracies (Levine et al.,
8 KLEINBERG ET AL.2017). We decided to extend the cross‐validation from Experiment 1
by validating the models from Experiment 1 with data from a new sam-
ple in Experiment 2.4 | EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 served four purposes. First, we wanted to replicate the
findings obtained in the machine learning analysis on data from an inde-
pendent sample. Second, the potential confound of different instruc-
tions to liars and truth‐tellers was corrected. Third, we wanted to test
whether the significant (and unexpected) differences found in the
exploratory analysis of Experiment 1 for individual LIWC and named
entity categories could be replicated. Fourth, we manipulated the pro-
vision of the model statement to examine whether a model statement
is beneficial to the detection of deceptive and truthful forthcoming
weekend plans. Because the primary interest of this investigation is
the detection of deceptive intentions, all participants were asked to
write about their plans for the coming weekend. Furthermore, because
the analytical focus of this investigation is on potentially scalable
methods, we used only automated analyses in Experiment 2. On the
basis of the findings from Experiment 1 and from studies that show
the beneficial effect of the model statement technique (Harvey et al.,
2017; Leal et al., 2015), we preregistered the following hypotheses:
• Deceptive statements will contain more (computer‐scored) per-
son, location, temporal, spatial, date, and time references than
deceptive statements.
• The machine learning classification accuracy of truthful and decep-
tive statements is above chance level. The classifier trained on the
data of Experiment 1 performs with above chance level accuracy
on the data of Experiment 2.
• The differences in linguistic and verbal content variables between
truthful and deceptive statements are larger when a model state-
ment is provided than when it is not, resulting in higher classifica-
tion accuracy.3For an exploration of automating how‐ and why‐utterances, see Supporting
Information S7.4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
The data collection procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. We
aimed to replicate the effects found in the first experiment and adhered
to the same sample size including a buffer for potential data loss,
resulting in 100 participants required per condition. Due to simultaneous
starting times, we collected data of 413 participants and, as per the
preregistered exclusion criteria, excluded those who could not recall
whether they were instructed to write a truthful or deceptive statement
after writing the statement (n = 28, final sample = 385).2 The remaining
385 participants were allocated blockwise into four experimental condi-
tions: a truthful condition with a model statement (n = 90, 66.67%
female, Mage = 32.56 years, SDage = 9.23), a deceptive condition with a2The IP exclusion was obsolete and not preregistered because Prolific Academic
has several control mechanisms built in to prevent multiple participations per
participant.model statement (n = 97, 70.10% female, Mage = 32.39, SDage = 10.42),
a truthful condition without a model statement (n = 101, 73.27% female,
Mage = 32.00, SDage = 9.36), and a deceptive condition without a model
statement (n = 97, 69.07% female, Mage = 33.55, SDage = 11.06). There
was no difference between the conditions in gender, X2(3) = 1.02,
p = .795, Cramer's V = 0.03, or age, F(1, 383) = 0.24, p = .626, f = 0.03.
4.1.2 | Changes compared with Experiment 1
Those who read the model statement followed the same procedure as
those in Experiment 1. Participants who did not read a model state-
ment were directed to the input field immediately after they received
their veracity instructions (including the prompt to be as detailed,
plausible, and convincing as possible). This procedure was based on
related previous studies (Bogaard et al., 2014; Leal et al., 2015). The
instructions provided to deceptive participants were changed to be
identical to those given to truth‐tellers; that is, all participants received
the nonspecific instructions (e.g., “throwing a party”).4.2 | Results
4.2.1 | Confirmatory analyses
Table 4 shows that the findings of Experiment 1 were supported for
person references and location references, which were both more
prevalent in deceptive than in truthful statements. There were no
veracity‐by‐model statement interaction effects. For person refer-
ences (with > without model statement) as well as for temporal
information (without > with a model statement) and date references
(without > with a model statement), there was a significant main effect
of the provision of the model statement, albeit only for person refer-
ences in the expected direction.3
Machine learning classification: Experiment 2
We predicted that the overall classification accuracy with a machine
learning approach would be significantly better than chance level. Spe-
cifically, we predicted that when with all LIWC categories, the resulting
classification accuracy was better than the chance level (here: 50.39%
due to a slight condition imbalance). The machine learning classifica-
tion resulted in an accuracy of 67.11% (95% CI [55.37%, 77.46%]) with
AUC = 0.69 (95% CI [0.57, 0.82]; sensitivity = 68.42%, specific-
ity = 65.79%). An exact binomial test revealed that accuracy was signif-
icantly higher than chance (p = .002).
We also predicted that the classification accuracy would be higher
when a model statement was provided than when participants did not
read a model statement. When a model statement was provided, we
found an accuracy of 62.16% (44.76–77.54%) with AUC = 0.66 (95%
CI [0.48, 0.84]; sensitivity = 38.89%, specificity = 84.21%), which was
not better than chance (p = .125). Without a model statement, the
accuracy was 56.41% (39.62–72.10%) with AUC = 0.63 (95% CI
[0.45, 0.82]; sensitivity = 65.00%, specificity = 47.37%, ns, p = .316).44The results show that the accuracy on the whole dataset is better than on both
separate subsets (model statement and no model statement). This is likely due to
the sample size used to train the classification models, whereby larger samples
contain more information to be used in the predictive model.
TABLE 4 Summary table with the confirmatory analyses for Experiment 2 (M, SD, Cohen's d)
Dependent variable
Without model statement With model statement
Main effect
veracity
Main effect
model
statement
Veracity *
Model
Statement Hyp.
Expected
truth–lie
difference
supported?Truthful Deceptive Truthful Deceptive
Person references
(NER)
16.58 (51.59) 23.59 (51.22) 23.68 (48.18) 40.23 (54.53) −0.11* (p = .026) 0.12* (p = .025) 0.04 (p = .365) D > T Yes
Location references
(NER)
18.91 (49.71) 29.67 (57.63) 24.55 (57.81) 42.82 (68.69) −0.12* (p = .016) 0.08 (p = .118) 0.03 (p = .532) D > T Yes
Temporal information
(LIWC)
9.10 (3.79) 9.06 (3.92) 7.91 (2.69) 8.01 (3.07) 0.01 (p = .941) 0.16* (p = .002) 0.01 (p = .849) T > D No
Spatial information
(LIWC)
7.56 (3.58) 7.81 (2.93) 7.86 (3.11) 7.88 (2.96) 0.02 (p = .680) 0.03 (p = .562) 0.02 (p = .727) D > T No
Date references
(NER)
170.54 (124.20) 175.76 (132.47) 133.89 (93.32) 139.11 (97.44) 0.02 (p = .652) 0.16* (p = .002) 0.00 (p = .999) T > D No
Time references
(NER)
52.79 (87.51) 36.91 (61.22) 45.60 (55.57) 48.95 (55.99) 0.05 (p = .358) 0.02 (p = .722) 0.07 (p = .159) T > D No
Number of words 121.83 (57.37) 118.55 (48.54) 202.88 (107.36) 188.43 (93.47) 0.06 (p = .276) 0.48*** (p < .001) 0.04 (p = .493) — —
Note. Negative effect sizes imply higher values in deceptive than in truthful statements. LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry andWord Count; NER, named entity recognition.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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ipants with the model statement would be significantly better than for
the participants who did not read the model statement. There was no
difference between the two classifiers, Venkatraman's AUC compari-
son test (E = 0.04, 2,000 bootstraps, p = .868). Note also that both
classifiers' accuracy did not outperform chance level.
Cross‐experiment machine learning classification
To assess the classification accuracy of machine learning classifiers on
independent data, we used the exact SVM classifier with the full LIWC
feature set of the intentions data from Experiment 1 and tested its per-
formance on the data from Experiment 2. That is, rather than evaluat-
ing the performance on holdout data from the same data collection, we
test it on truly independent data from a different sample. This analysis
resulted in an accuracy of 61.30% (56.23–66.19%) with an AUC of
0.64 (95% CI [0.59, 0.70]; sensitivity = 68.59; specificity = 54.12,
p < .001). Moreover, when we tested the classifier on the data of par-
ticipants who read the model statement (i.e., identical to Experiment 1),
the accuracy was 63.10% (55.75–70.03%; AUC = 0.64, 95% CI [0.57,
0.72]; sensitivity = 66.67; specificity = 59.79, p = .001).4.2.2 | Exploratory analysis
For comparison purposes, we also explored the length of statement
(Table 4) as a function of veracity and the model statement. As in pre-
vious research, statements were lengthier when participants read the
model statement (M = 188.35, SD = 97.24) than when they did not
(M = 115.94, SD = 51.67). The findings are in line with previous
research showing that a model statement increased information pro-
vided by the participants (Bogaard et al., 2014; Leal et al., 2015).5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study examined whether the statements written about someone's
weekend plans can reveal his or her veracity. In two experiments, par-
ticipants wrote either a deceptive or truthful statement about theirplanned activities on the forthcoming weekend. In the first experiment,
all participants read a detailed model statement and were asked to lie
or tell the truth about their weekend plans. The theory of verbal
deception detection predicts that truthfully intended activities can be
recalled in more detail and contain more planning markers and fewer
justifications for the intended actions than deceptive intentions.
Because the primary aim of this study was to test the detectability of
deceptive intentions in a potentially large‐scale setting, we collected
data through an online interface and focused on computer‐automated
analysis.5.1 | Predicting the veracity of statement
From an applied perspective, such as prospective passenger screening,
the prediction accuracy of a model might be more important than the
explanatory aspects underlying it. With the use of machine learning,
deceptive and truthful statements were classified well above chance
with relatively high accuracies of 74.19% and 80.65%, respectively.
To assess the “true” performance of a predictive model, it is important
to test it on newly collected data. In fact, most machine learning
approaches to verbal deception detection are not evaluated on data
from a new sample (Fitzpatrick et al., 2015), and most of the reported
accuracy rates in the psycholegal literature were obtained without any
cross‐validation (see the critique by Levine et al., 2017). We, therefore,
examined the robustness of these accuracy rates with cross‐validation
within the sample as well as on a new sample in the second experiment.
The current investigation is, to the best of our knowledge, the only one
that tested a classifier's accuracy on fresh, independent data from a new
sample. The results are promising in that they withstood the cross‐
experiment test, but they also highlight the drop of the accuracy when
classifiers were applied to out‐of‐sample data. The accuracy rates will
per definition be higher if the classifier is trained and tested on the same
data, compared with a proper validation on a new sample (Yarkoni &
Westfall, 2017). Although data from the first experiment suggest accura-
cies of up to 80%, the independent‐sample validation indicated that the
true boundaries might be closer to 63% (similar accuracies using
10 KLEINBERG ET AL.automated analysis were achieved by Pérez‐Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014).
We strongly recommend that future research that makes claims about
prediction incorporate a cross‐validation (e.g., train–test split or leave‐
one‐out cross‐validation) and proper, actual validation on a new sample
to avoid the reporting of overestimated accuracies. In the current study,
without proper validation on a new sample, the reported accuracies
would have been falsely exaggerated by more than 25%.5.2 | Do liars over‐prepare their statement?
As expected, past weekend activities were, in general, lengthier and
contained more planning markers than statements about the forthcoming
weekend. This effect is in line with other studies showing that experi-
enced events can be recalled in more depth than not yet experienced
events (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). We found support for
the hypothesis that truthful statements contain more indicators of careful
planning (i.e., how‐utterances) than false ones, which might be attribut-
able to the motivation of actually executing the plan, whereas fabricated
intentions do not evoke such a motivation (Mac Giolla et al., 2013). Crit-
ically, however, there were no differences in the length, the richness of
detail, or justifications between truthful and deceptive accounts.
Although no differences emerged in the computer‐automated
extraction of the richness of detail (LIWC) and the specificity of infor-
mation (named entities), exploratory analyses hinted at unexpected
underlying dynamics of deceptive and truthful accounts: In line with
the theory, truthful statements about intentions contained more tem-
poral information, more time, and more date references than deceptive
ones. However, contrary to the expectation, deceptive statements
contained more person entities, more place entities, and more spatial
information. Theoretical lines would predict that these kinds of aspects
are rather unlikely for liars because they would offer potentially check-
able details (e.g., a person to consult or a CCTV camera at a specific
place to examine). To assess whether these findings replicate, we
preregistered a second experiment where we hypothesized the
observed, unexpected dynamics. Moreover, the second experiment
excluded a potential confound in the instructions (i.e., adding a person
or location reference to the liars' instructions) and experimentally
manipulated the presence of the model statement.
Did the unexpected findings for location and person entities rep-
licate? The effect sizes of the location entities (Experiment 1:
f = −0.21; Experiment 2: f = −0.12) and person entities (Experiment
1: f = −0.27; Experiment 2: f = −0.11) were smaller in the second
experiment. One reason for the decrease in the magnitude of the
truth–lie differences could be that Experiment 2 did not contain the
confounding, overly specific instructions of Experiment 1. If this were
the case, the corroboration of these counterintuitive findings is even
more interesting because it suggests that even without any hint at
persons or locations, liars tend to include significantly more of these
entities. Interestingly, comparable findings were reported in a study
about a forthcoming trip (Warmelink et al., 2012). When asked about
their intention (“What is the main purpose of your trip?”), liars
reported significantly more detail than truth‐tellers, and vice versa
for less expected questions (“How are you going to travel to your
destination?”). There are two potential explanations for the current
findings. First, liars might have simply chosen to bluff. Possibly, thisstrategy is specific for the online data collection context applied here,
with liars being aware that the information about a future event
would be difficult to check. Second, liars might have prepared more
for the statement and might have been preoccupied with a detailed,
convincing yet false account. Truth‐tellers, in contrast, could have
relied on the idea that their truthfulness “shines through” (“the illusion
of transparency,” Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010, p. 109) without the
need to prepare extensively. Tentative support in that direction stems
from post hoc analysis on the time needed to write the statement
(seconds per word): In the second experiment, liars took longer
(M = 3.17 sec./word, SD = 2.94) than truth‐tellers (M = 2.52, SD = 1.31,
f = 0.14, p < .001). This trend was not significant for Experiment 1
(Mt = 2.51, SDt = 1.87, Md = 2.64, SDd = 1.22, f = 0.04, ns).
Liars might find it difficult to imagine what a truthful statement
about an intended action might look like so that they include unrealis-
tically many specific pieces of information out of precaution to sound
believable. If this were the case, the naiveté of liars might possibly
work in their disadvantage and give away their deceit. It would be
interesting for future research to use questions that asks about things
that truth‐tellers typically do not have an answer for.5.3 | The model statement technique
We did not find support for the hypothesis that providing a model
statement benefits deception detection. Unexpectedly, participants
who read a model statement provided fewer date entities and tempo-
ral information but more person entities than those who did read a
model statement. These latter findings would need corroboration.
The absence of a beneficial effect of the model statement was also
reported elsewhere (Bogaard et al., 2014; Brackmann et al., 2017;
Ewens et al., 2016; Harvey et al., 2017; Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, Leal,
et al., 2017). We see two possible explanations. First, hidden modera-
tors might determine the role of the model statement. Looking at the
verbal cues—especially details, at a more granular level (e.g., qualifying
details into verifiable details, script behavior details, and complications)
—could be an important aspect for further research (the data of the
two experiments are openly available). Second, the null findings might
be due to boundary conditions of the model statement technique. We
provided participants with a model statement about a past event (i.e.,
first day at uni). Future research could assess whether an alignment
of the temporal focus of the model statement and the participants'
action (i.e., past or future action) is necessary. Furthermore, the length
requirement that we imposed on all statements (minimum of 80 words)
could have played a role. Although intended as a safeguard to elicit suf-
ficient information in the online context, it is possible that this resulted
in unnatural content and blurred potential truth–lie differences.
5.3.1 | Manual versus automated text analysis
Concerning the large‐scale focus in this study, two aspects merit
attention.
1. Although the computer‐automated analysis was applied success-
fully above chance level in the current study, the value of manual
human scoring cannot (yet) be dismissed. Semantic, linguistic con-
cepts such as plausibility are not yet easily automatable. Likewise,
KLEINBERG ET AL. 11promising approaches such as the verifiability approach (i.e.,
looking at verifiable details, Nahari et al., 2014) are currently lim-
ited to manual annotation, which limits their large‐scale potential.
The technical question of human versus automated coding per-
formance might best be answered in direct comparisons and
rigorous empirical testing. Such a comparison should test which
technique yields the best accuracies and, most importantly, pro-
duces replicable and generalizable results. Because the aim of
the current paper was to predict the veracity rather than illumi-
nate the theoretical underpinnings of it, we focused more on
the machine learning part rather than the individual cues under-
pinning it. We do acknowledge that the theory matters and
should, in fact, be incorporated into predictive models to make
use of the best of both worlds. In the future, hybrid approaches
(e.g., Kleinberg, Mozes, et al., 2017) might help bridge the gap
between theory and methods and human and automated analy-
ses: Human annotations of the verifiability, for example, could
be used as outcome variables for a predictive linguistic model.
Ideally, this could result in a real‐time and valid proxy for other-
wise manually coded constructs.
2. The current study relied on a passive collection of data. Alter-
natively, future approaches could explore how dynamic conver-
sational environments (e.g., online chat) facilitate deception
detection. Such a line of inquiry might also help to shorten the
participation duration which is essential for applied purposes
and would allow for the targeted elicitation of needed informa-
tion (e.g., those pieces that could be verified).6 | CONCLUSION
Verbal deception detection is a promising yet complex path for the
detection of deceptive intentions—both from an academic and from
an applied perspective. In two experiments, we found evidence that
liars mentioned more person and location references than truth‐tellers,
which may be exploited for the detection of their false accounts. Pre-
dictive modeling with psycholinguistic features yielded promising
results above chance level. At the same time, independent validation
showed that within‐sample cross‐validation might still overestimate
classification accuracies. The current findings provide novel insights
into liars' strategies, highlight the promise of machine learning for
deception detection, and emphasize the need for proper validation of
predictive deception detection analysis.
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